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Abstract
There is a longstanding debate in the logico-philosophical community as to why the Go¨delian sentences of a consistent
and sufficiently strong theory are true. The prevalent argument seems to be something like this: since every one of
the Go¨delian sentences of such a theory is equivalent to the theory’s consistency statement, even provably so inside the
theory, the truth of those sentences follows from the consistency of the theory in question. So, Go¨delian sentences of
consistent theories should be true. In this paper, we show that Go¨delian sentences of only sound theories are true; and
there is a long road from consistency to soundness, indeed a hierarchy of conditions which are satisfied by some theories
and falsified by others. We also study the truth of Rosserian sentences and provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for the truth of Rosserian (and also Go¨delian) sentences of theories.
Keywords: The Incompleteness Theorem; Go¨delian Sentences, Rosser’s Trick, Rosserian Sentences, Soundness,
Consistency, Σn-Soundness.
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1 Introduction
By the first incompleteness theorem of Go¨del (1931), for every consistent and sufficiently strong arithmetical
theory there are sentences which are undecidable in the theory ([5]). Examples of such undecidable sentences
are actually constructed in Go¨del’s original proof (hence Go¨delian sentences) each of which is equivalent to
its own unprovability in the theory; see Definition 2.1 below. A natural question here is that while the theory
in question cannot decide the truth of its Go¨delian sentences, what about us (humans)? Can we “see” (or
demonstrate) their truth? This question has attracted the attention of many philosophers, physicists, computer
scientists, as well as mathematical logicians. As there are numerous papers and books on this subject, it is not
possible to cite them all here; see the Conclusions for a few. In this paper, we present necessary and sufficient
conditions for the truth of Go¨delian sentences (and Rosserian sentences) of consistent and sufficiently strong
arithmetical theories (see the diagram in the Conclusions section).
We assume familiarity with the notions of Πn and Σn formulae, Robinson’s Arithmetic Q, and the fact that
Q is a sound and Σ1-complete theory (i.e., every Q-provable sentence is true and every true Σ1-sentence is
Q-provable); see e.g. [9]. By the Diagonal Lemma of Go¨del and Carnap, see e.g. [24], for every formulaΨ(x)
with the only free variable x, there exists a sentence θ such that θ↔Ψ(#θ) is true (in the standard model of
natural numbers N) and also provable in Q; here #A denotes the numeral of the Go¨del code of A, relative to
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a fixed Go¨del numbering (arithmetization) of the syntax. Moreover, if Ψ(x) is a Πn-formula, then θ can be
taken to be a Πn-sentence; and if Ψ(x) is Σn, then θ can be taken to be Σn too. We provide more details in the
following:
LEMMA 1.1 (The Diagonal Lemma): Let n>1.
For every Πn-formula Ψ(x) there exists a Πn-sentence θ such that Q ⊢ θ↔Ψ(#θ).
And for every Σn-formula Ψ(x) there exists a Σn-sentence θ with the above property.
PROOF: There exists a Σ1-formula δ(x, y), in the language of arithmetic, that strongly represents the diagonal
(primitive recursive) function d which assigns to a givenm the Go¨del code of the expression that results from
substitutingm (the numeral ofm, a term in the language of arithmetic representingm) for all the free variables
(if any) of the expression coded bym. So, for everym∈N we have Q ⊢ ∀y[δ(m, y)↔y=d(m)].
IfΨ(x) is aΠn-formula, then put α(x)=∀y[δ(x, y)→Ψ(y)], and let a be its Go¨del code. Now, let θ=α(a);
then θ is a Πn-sentence and we have provably in Q that
θ=∀y[δ(a, y)→Ψ(y)]↔∀y[y=d(a)→Ψ(y)]↔∀y[y=#θ→Ψ(y)]↔Ψ(#θ).
If Ψ(x) is a Σn-formula, then put η(x)=∃y[δ(x, y)∧Ψ(y)], and let e be its Go¨del code. Now, let θ=α(e);
then θ is a Σn-sentence and we have provably in Q that
θ=∃y[δ(e, y)∧Ψ(y)]↔∃y[y=d(e)∧Ψ(y)]↔∃y[y=#θ∧Ψ(y)]↔Ψ(#θ). QED|
This lemma is one of the breakthroughs of Go¨del’s theorem (and of modern logic). The incompleteness
theorem is usually stated for recursively enumerable (RE) theories that extend Q; though it also holds for more
general theories, see e.g. [23]. If a theory is RE, then it can be defined by a Σ1-formula, see [9, Theorem 3.3.],
and so its theorems (i.e., provable sentences) can also be defined by a Σ1-formula.
CONVENTION 1.2: Throughout, let T be an RE extension of Q. Let PrT (x) be a provability predicate for
T , which is a Σ1-formula, relative to a fixed Go¨del numbering. A basic property of PrT (x) is that for every
sentence ϕ we have
T ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ N  PrT (#ϕ) ⇐⇒ Q ⊢ PrT (#ϕ).
Let ConT =¬PrT (#[0 6=0]) be the (Π1-)sentence that expresses T ’s consistency. ⋄
2 Go¨del Sentences and their Truth.
Go¨del’s proof of his incompleteness theorem uses the diagonal lemma for the negation of the provability
predicate of T .
DEFINITION 2.1 (Go¨delian Sentences): A sentence γ is called a Go¨delian sentence of T when we have
T ⊢ γ↔¬PrT (#γ). ⋄
Since for sufficiently strong theories T any two Go¨delian sentences are T -provably equivalent, see e.g.
[28, Remark 2.2.5.], many authors talk of the Go¨del sentence of T . However, we will show that every unsound
theory has both true and false Go¨del sentences; so, even though the theory proves (unsoundly) that those
sentences are equivalent, in reality they are not. Go¨del [5], and several authors after him, e.g. [28, p. 825], [29,
p. 7], or [17, p. 6], argue that Go¨delian sentences of a sufficiently strong theory are true, since
(1) they are provably equivalent with their unprovability in the theory, and
(2) they are indeed unprovable in the theory; and so
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(3) they must be true.
It is argued in [12] that this line of reasoning does not demonstrate the truth of Go¨delian sentences, and
indeed some (Σ1-)unsound theories may have false Go¨delian sentences. In fact, the assumption (2) in the
above argument (of Go¨del) is redundant:
LEMMA 2.2: If T is consistent, then for every sentence ϕ, T ⊢ ϕ→¬PrT (#ϕ) implies T 0 ϕ.
PROOF: Since T ⊢ ϕ would imply on the one hand T ⊢ ¬PrT (#ϕ) by the assumption, and on the other hand
T ⊢ PrT (#ϕ) by Convention 1.2. QED|
So, the question of the validity of the above reasoning for the truth of Go¨delian sentences boils down to the
following question:
Does T ⊢ γ↔¬PrT (#γ), for a consistent T , imply that N  γ?
Or put in another way, under which conditions all the Go¨delian sentences of T are true?
We answer this question in the present section, and in the next section we answer a similar question for the
Rosserian sentences (of arithmetical theories). Let us start with a characterization of the unprovable sentences:
PROPOSITION 2.3 (Characterizing Unprovable Sentences): Suppose that Lo¨b’s Rule holds for T . The
following are equivalent for every sentence ϕ:
(1) ϕ is unprovable in T , i.e., T 0 ϕ;
(2) ϕ is a Go¨delian sentence of some consistent extension U of T ;
(3) T + [ϕ↔¬PrT (#ϕ)] is consistent.
PROOF:
(1⇒2): There exists, by Lemma 1.1, a sentence ξ such that
T ⊢ ξ↔ [ϕ↔¬PrT+ξ(#ϕ)].
Let U = T +ξ; then U ⊢ ϕ↔¬PrU(#ϕ) and it remains to show that U is consistent. If not, then T ⊢ ¬ξ.
So, on the one hand we have (i) T ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔ ¬PrU(#ϕ)], and on the other hand U ⊢ ϕ which implies (ii)
T ⊢ PrU(#ϕ) by Convention 1.2. Now, (i) and (ii) imply that T ⊢ ϕ, contradicting the assumption.
(2⇒3): If T +[ϕ↔¬PrT (#ϕ)] is not consistent, then T ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔¬PrT (#ϕ)], and so T ⊢ PrT (#ϕ)→ϕ,
which implies T ⊢ ϕ by Lo¨b’s Rule. So, for every extension U of T we have U ⊢ ϕ, and so, by Conven-
tion 1.2, U ⊢ PrU(#ϕ). Therefore, for every such U we have U ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔¬PrU(#ϕ)], which contradicts the
assumption.
(3⇒ 1): If T ⊢ ϕ, then, by Convention 1.2, we have that T ⊢ PrT (#ϕ), and so we should have also
T ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔¬PrT (#ϕ)]. QED|
It should be noted that the assumption of holding Lo¨b’s Rule for T was used only in the implication (2⇒3).
So, (1) and (2) are equivalent with each other, and are implied by (3), even when this rule does not hold. We
now provide a necessary and sufficient condition, on a sufficiently strong T , for the truth of all the Go¨delian
Π1-sentences of T :
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THEOREM 2.4 (On the Truth and Independence of Go¨delian Π1-Sentences): Suppose that T satisfies the
following two conditions:
(I) T ⊢ ¬ConT→PrT (#ϕ) for every sentence ϕ, and
(II) T ⊢ ConT→¬PrT (#γ) for every Go¨delian sentence γ of T .
If T ⊢ ¬ConT , then every false Π1-sentence is a Go¨delian sentence of T , and no Go¨delian sentence of T is
independent from T .
If T 0 ¬ConT , then all the Go¨delian Π1-sentences of T are true, and all the Go¨delian sentences of T are
independent from T .
PROOF: If T ⊢ ¬ConT , then by (I) we have T ⊢ PrT (#ϕ) for every sentence ϕ. So, for every Go¨delian
sentence γ of T we have T ⊢ ¬γ; thus no Go¨delian sentence of T can be independent from T . Now, let φ be
an arbitrary false Π1-sentence; then ¬φ is a true Σ1-sentence, and so provable in Q. Thus, T ⊢ ¬φ; and so
from T ⊢ PrT (#φ) we have T ⊢ φ↔¬PrT (#φ), which means that φ is a (false) Go¨delian Π1-sentence of T .
If T 0 ¬ConT , then by (II) for every Go¨delian sentence γ of T we have T 0 PrT (#γ), and so T 0 ¬γ; thus
γ is independent from T (noting that T is consistent and so we also have T 0 γ by Lemma 2.2). If a Go¨delian
Π1-sentence τ of T is not true, then ¬τ is a true Σ1-sentence, and so should be Q-provable; a contradiction
with the T -independence of τ proved above. QED|
Every extension of Peano’s Arithmetic PA satisfies (I) and (II) in Theorem 2.4; as a matter of fact (II) is
a formalization of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem (in T ). If T is (Σ1-)sound, then T 0 ¬ConT . If T is
inconsistent or T = S+¬ConS, where S is a consistent extension of PA, then T ⊢ ¬ConT ; in the latter case
T is consistent by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. Thus, by Theorem 2.4, a necessary and sufficient
condition for the truth of all the Go¨delian Π1-sentences of T is the consistency of T with ConT , a condition
obviously implied by ω-consistency; though, this condition is stronger than the mere consistency of T , see
[8, Theorem 36]. For investigating the truth of Go¨delian Πn+1-sentences (and Σn+1-sentences) we make a
definition and an observation. Before that let us note that no Go¨delian Σ1-sentence of a consistent extension
of Q can be true:
PROPOSITION 2.5 (On the Truth of Go¨delian Σ1-Sentences): No Go¨delian Σ1-sentence of T can be true
if T is consistent.
PROOF: If a Go¨delian Σ1-sentence of T were true, then it would have been provable in Q, and this would have
contradicted Lemma 2.2 for consistent T . QED|
DEFINITION 2.6 (Γ-Soundness): Let Γ be a class of sentences. A theory S is called Γ-sound when every
S-provable Γ-sentence is true. ⋄
The following lemma has been proved for Γ=Σ1,Σ2 in [8, Theorems 25, 27, 30,32]:
LEMMA 2.7 (On Extensions of Γ-Sound Theories): Let Γ be a class of sentences that is closed under dis-
junction. If T is a Γ-sound theory, then for every sentence ϕ, either T+ϕ or T+¬ϕ is Γ-sound.
PROOF: If neither T+ϕ nor T+¬ϕ is Γ-sound, then for some false Γ-sentences ς and ς ′ we have T+ϕ ⊢ ς
and T+¬ϕ ⊢ ς ′. Thus, T ⊢ ς∨ς ′, and ς∨ς ′ is a false Γ-sentence; a contradiction. QED|
One of our main results is the following necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of Go¨delian (Πn+1
and Σn+1) sentences:
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THEOREM 2.8 (The Truth of Go¨del Sentences): Let n>1.
All the Go¨delian Πn+1-sentences of T are true if and only if T is Πn+1-sound.
All the Go¨delian Σn+1-sentences of T are true if and only if T is Σn+1-sound.
PROOF: Let Γ be any of Πn+1 or Σn+1.
First, suppose that T is Γ-sound, and let γ be a Go¨delian Γ-sentence of the theory T . By Lemma 2.2 and
Convention 1.2 we have N  ¬PrT (#γ), and so PrT (#γ) is a false Σ1-sentence. Now, T+¬γ ⊢ PrT (#γ),
and so T+¬γ is not Σ1-sound; whence, it is not Γ-sound either. Thus, by Lemma 2.7, the theory T+γ should
be Γ-sound. Therefore, γ must be true.
Now, suppose that all the Go¨delian Γ-sentences of T are true. We show that the theory T is Γ-sound.
Assume that T ⊢ ς for a Γ-sentence ς . We prove that ς is true. By Lemma 1.1 there exists a Γ-sentence ζ
such that Q ⊢ ζ↔ [ς∧¬PrT (#ζ)]. Thus, from T ⊢ ς we have T ⊢ ζ↔¬PrT (#ζ), and so ζ is a Go¨delian
Γ-sentence of T . Whence, ζ is true, and so, by the soundness of Q, we have N  ς . QED|
Whence, all the Go¨delian sentences of a theory are true if and only if the theory is sound; cf. also [27,
Theorem 24.7.].
REMARK 2.9 (On the Hierarchy of Πn,Σn-Soundness): Let us note that an extension of Q is consistent
if and only if it is Π1-sound: indeed, no consistent extension of Q can prove a false Π1-sentence, since the
negation of such a sentence would be a true Σ1-sentence and so would be provable in Q.
One can also show that a theory is Σn-sound if and only if it is Πn+1-sound: if the theory S is Σn-sound
and S ⊢ pi, where pi is a Πn+1-sentence, then write pi=∀xσ(x) for a Σn-formula σ; since for every k∈N we
have S ⊢ σ(k), and σ(k) is a Σn-sentence, then N  σ(k) for every k∈N, so N  ∀xσ(x)=pi.
The hierarchy of Σn-sound theories is strict, since there are some Σn-sound theories which are not Σn+1-
sound; this is proved in e.g. [23, Theorem 2.5.] and also [10, Theorem 4.8.]. Therefore, the truth of (even all)
the Go¨delian Πn+1-sentences (respectively, Σn+1-sentences) of a theory does not necessarily imply the truth
of its Go¨delian Πn+2-sentences (respectively, Σn+2-sentences). ⋄
3 Rosserian Sentences and their Truth.
In Theorem 2.4 we saw that Go¨delian sentences of some theories could be refutable in them (though, they
are always unprovable in consistent theories, see Lemma 2.2). Rosser’s trick ([22]) constructs an independent
sentence for a given theory (which is an RE extension of Q), when it is consistent. Before going into Rosser’s
construction, let us note that no construction similar to Go¨del’s can result in an independent sentence.
DEFINITION 3.1 (Pseudo-Go¨delian Sentences): Let us call ψ a pseudo-Go¨delian sentence of a theory T
when there are some propositional formulas C1(p), · · · , Cn(p), over the one propositional variable p, and
there is one propositional formula B(p1, · · · , pn), over the propositional variables p1, · · · , pn, such that we
have T ⊢ ψ↔B
(
PrT [#C1(ψ)], · · · , PrT [#Cn(ψ)]
)
. ⋄
For example, the sentencesPT andRT for which we have
T ⊢ PT↔
[
¬PrT (#PT )∧¬PrT (#[¬PT ])
]
and T ⊢ RT↔
[
PrT (#RT )→¬PrT (#[¬RT ])
]
,
are both some peudo-Go¨delian sentences of T . For an alternative formulation of the following result see [29,
Exercise 1, p. 149].
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PROPOSITION 3.2 (Decidability of Pseudo-Go¨delian Sentences): No pseudo-Go¨delian sentence of U =
T+¬ConT can be independent from U .
PROOF: Let ψ be a pseudo-Go¨delian sentence of the theory U=T+¬ConT . For every sentence ζ we have U ⊢
PrU(#ζ). Now,B(⊤, · · · ,⊤), where⊤ denotes the propositional truth, is equivalent to either⊤ or⊥, where
⊥ denotes the propositional falsum. If B(⊤, · · · ,⊤) ≡ ⊤, then U ⊢ B
(
PrU [C1(#ψ)], · · · , PrU [Cn(#ψ)]
)
;
and if B(⊤, · · · ,⊤) ≡ ⊥, then U ⊢ ¬B
(
PrU [C1(#ψ)], · · · , PrU [Cn(#ψ)]
)
. As a result, we have either
U ⊢ ψ or U ⊢ ¬ψ; thus ψ is not independent from U . QED|
In both of the above examples, it can be seen that U ⊢ ¬PU and U ⊢ ¬RU hold for the theory U = T+¬ConT .
Thus, for getting independent sentences (of consistent theories) one should go beyond the (pesudo-)Go¨delian
sentences.
The T -provability predicate PrT (x) in Convention 1.2 is usually constructed from a T -proof predicate
prfT (y, x), as PrT (x)= ∃y prfT (y, x); where prfT (y, x) is a ∆1-formula stating that “y is (the Go¨del code
of) a proof in T of the formula (coded by) x”.
CONVENTION 3.3: Let us fix a proof predicate of T as the∆1-formula prfT (y, x) that satisfies the following
for every sentence ϕ:
T ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ Q ⊢ prfT (m,#ϕ) for somem∈N.
T 0 ϕ ⇐⇒ Q ⊢ ¬prfT (n,#ϕ) for every n∈N. ⋄
DEFINITION 3.4 (Rosserian Provability and Rosserian Sentences): The following Σ1-formula, with the
free variable x, is the Rosserian Provability predicate of T :
R.PrT (x) = ∃y [prfT (y, x) ∧ ∀z<y ¬prfT (z,¬x)].
A sentence ρ is called a Rosserian sentence of T when we have T ⊢ ρ↔¬R.PrT (#ρ). ⋄
The independence of the Rosserian sentences (from the theory in question) follows form the following
basic properties of the Rosserian provability:
LEMMA 3.5: If T is consistent, then for every sentence ϕ we have
(1) T ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ Q ⊢ R.PrT (#ϕ).
(2) T ⊢ ¬ϕ =⇒ Q ⊢ ¬R.PrT (#ϕ).
PROOF: For (1) it suffices to note that for a consistent theory T we have: T ⊢ ϕ if and only if the Σ1-
sentence R.PrT (#ϕ) is true. For (2) suppose that T ⊢ ¬ϕ; then by Convention 3.3 for some m we have
Q ⊢ prfT (m,#[¬ϕ]). Now, reason inside Q: for any y with prfT (y,#ϕ) we should have y > m, since no
i6m (which are i = 0, · · · , m) could satisfy prfT (i,#ϕ) by Convention 3.3, and so for some z<y, which is
z=m, we have prfT (z,#[¬ϕ]). Thus, we have ∀y[prfT (y,#ϕ)→∃z<y prfT (z,#[¬ϕ])] or, equivalently,
¬R.PrT (#ϕ). QED|
Now, we can characterize the independent sentences of T similarly to Proposition 2.3:
PROPOSITION 3.6 (Characterizing Independent Sentences): Let ϕ be a sentence.
The following are equivalent:
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(1) ϕ is independent from T , i.e., T 0 ϕ and T 0 ¬ϕ;
(2) ϕ is a Rosserian sentence of some consistent extension U of T ;
and are implied by the following:
(3) T + [ϕ↔¬R.PrT (#ϕ)] is consistent.
PROOF: First we show the equivalence of (1) and (2).
(1⇒2): By Lemma 1.1 for some sentence ξ we have T ⊢ ξ↔ [ϕ↔¬R.PrT+ξ(#ϕ)]. Let U =T+ξ; then
U ⊢ ϕ↔¬R.PrU(#ϕ) which shows that ϕ is a Rosserian sentence of U . We show that U is consistent. If not,
then T ⊢ ¬ξ. Thus, (∗) T ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔¬R.PrU(#ϕ)]. Also, U ⊢ ϕ and U ⊢ ¬ϕ, and so by Convention 3.3 there
arem,n∈N such that Q ⊢ prfU(m,#ϕ) and Q ⊢ prfU(n,#[¬ϕ]); we can assume thatm and n are the least
such numbers.
(i) If m6 n, then Q ⊢ prfU(m,#ϕ) ∧ ∀z <m¬prfU(z,#[¬ϕ]) and so Q ⊢ R.PrU(#ϕ), which implies
by (∗) that T ⊢ ϕ; contradicting (1).
(ii) If n<m, then Q ⊢ ∀y[prfU(y,#ϕ)→y>m→∃z<y prfU(z,#[¬ϕ])], since one can take z=n, and
so Q ⊢ ¬R.PrU(#ϕ), which implies by (∗) that T ⊢ ¬ϕ; contradicting (1) again.
So, U must be consistent.
(2⇒1): It suffices to show that ϕ is independent from U . If U ⊢ ρ, then we should have on the one hand
U ⊢ R.PrU(#ρ) by Lemma 3.5(1), and on the other hand U ⊢ ¬R.PrU(#ρ) by Definition 3.4; thus, U could
not be consistent. Also U ⊢ ¬ρ would imply on the one hand U ⊢ ¬R.PrU(#ρ) by Lemma 3.5(2), and on the
other hand U ⊢ R.PrU(#ρ) by Definition 3.4; contradicting U’s consistency again.
Now, we show that (3) implies (1); and so (2) too.
(3⇒1): Note that the theory T is consistent by the assumption. If T ⊢ ϕ, then by Lemma 3.5(1) we would
have T ⊢ R.PrT (#ϕ), and so T ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔¬R.PrT (#ϕ)]. If T ⊢ ¬ϕ, then Lemma 3.5(2) would imply that
T ⊢ ¬R.PrT (#ϕ), and so we would have T ⊢ ¬[ϕ↔¬R.PrT (#ϕ)] again. QED|
REMARK 3.7 (Lo¨b-Like Rule for Rosserian Provability): Let us note that the contraposition of the impli-
cation (1⇒3) in Proposition 3.6 says that if T ⊢ ϕ↔R.PrT (#ϕ), i.e., if ϕ is a Rosser-type Henkin sentence
so called by Kurahashi (in [11]), then ϕ is not independent from T . Actually, it is shown in [11] that there
are standard proof predicates prf′T (y, x) which have independent Rosser-type Henkin sentences, and there
are standard proof predicates prf′′T (y, x) none of whose Rosser-type Henkin sentences are independent. The
latter proof predicates satisfy (1⇒ 3) in Proposition 3.6 and satisfy a Lo¨b-like rule for Rosserian provability;
while the former ones do not satisfy (1⇒3) in Proposition 3.6, and do not satisfy any Lo¨b-like rule for Rosse-
rian provability. So, the implication (1⇒3) in Proposition 3.6 depends on the proof predicate prfT (y, x), and
is not robust. ⋄
Unlike Go¨delian Π1-sentences, all the Rosserian Π1-sentences of consistent theories are true, and like
Go¨delian Σ1-sentence, all of their Rosserian Σ1-sentences are false:
THEOREM 3.8 (On the Truth of the Rosserian Π1,Σ1-Sentences): Every Rosserian Π1-sentence of T is
true, and every Rosserian Σ1-sentence of T is false, if T is consistent.
PROOF: If a Rosserian Π1-sentence were false, then its negation would be a true Σ1-sentence, and so would
be provable in the theory Q; contradicting Rosser’s theorem on the independence of Rosserian sentences
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(Proposition 3.6). If a RosserianΣ1-sentence were true, then it would be provable in the theory Q; contradicting
the unprovability of Rosserian sentences. QED|
However, for n > 1, the truth of all the Go¨delian Πn+1-sentences is equivalent to the truth of all the
Rosserian Πn+1-sentences; and the truth of all the Go¨delian Σn+1-sentences is equivalent to the truth of all the
Rosserian Σn+1-sentences:
THEOREM 3.9 (On the Truth of the Rosserian Πn+1,Σn+1-Sentences): Fix n>1.
All the Rosserian Πn+1-sentences of T are true if and only if T is Πn+1-sound.
All the Rosserian Σn+1-sentences of T are true if and only if T is Σn+1-sound.
PROOF: This can be proved in the same lines of the proof of Theorem 2.8 by using Lemma 3.5 (instead of
Lemma 2.2) which implies that R.PrT (#ρ) is a false Σ1-sentence when ρ is a Rosserian sentence of consistent
theory T . QED|
Whence, all the Rosserian sentences of T are true if and only if T is sound; cf. [27, Theorem 24.7.].
4 Conclusions.
The first one who talked about the truth of Go¨delian sentences was Go¨del himself [5]. This turned into a
serious debate with [6] in which (what we call now) the Go¨del Disjunction was announced; see [4] and [7]
and the references therein. The so called Anti-Mechanism Thesis, or the Lucas-Penrose Argument, started
with [13] and popularized by [16]; see also [15] and [20]. After that, there has been a large discussion on
the truth of Go¨delian sentences; see e.g. [3], [28], [1], [26], [30], [21], [17], [14], [25], [8], [2], [18] and
[19]. As shown above, the consistency of a theory need not imply the truth of (all of) its Go¨delian (Π1-
)sentences; but does imply the truth of its all Rosserian Π1-sentences. One wonders why the proponents of
the anti-mechanism thesis have not used the Rosserian (Π1-)sentences for their reasoning; since the truth of
those sentences are straightforward (and immediately follows from the consistency of the theory). Though,
the opponents have argued that actually for “seeing” the truth of Go¨delian (Π1-)sentences one should “see” (at
least) the consistency of the theory (and indeed, more than that). Our old and new results are summarized in
the following diagram; note that the conditions get (strictly) stronger from bottom to top.
Soundness ≡ Truth of Go¨delian and Rosserian Sentences
...
Σn+1 (Πn+2) Soundness ≡ Truth of Go¨delian, Rosserian Σn+1,Πn+2 Sentences
...
Σ2 (Π3) Soundness ≡ Truth of Go¨delian, Rosserian Σ2,Π3 Sentences
Σ1 (Π2) Soundness ≡ Truth of Go¨delian, Rosserian Π2 Sentences
Consistency of T+ConT ≡ Truth of Go¨delian Π1 Sentences
Consistency (Π1 Soundness) ≡ Truth of Rosserian Π1 Sentences
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consistency (Π1 Soundness) ≡ Falsity of Go¨delian, Rosserian Σ1 Sentences
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